LogicWeb mobile code consists of Prolog-like rules embedded in Web pages, thereby adding logic programming behaviour to those pages. Since LogicWeb programs are downloaded from foreign hosts and executed locally, there is a need to protect the client from buggy or malicious code. A security model is crucial for making LogicWeb mobile code safe to execute. This paper presents such a model, which supports programs of varying trust levels by using different resource access policies. The implementation of the model derives from an extended operational semantics for the LogicWeb language, which provides a precise meaning of safety.
Introduction
A significant development of the World Wide Web, which has attracted considerable interest in recent years, is the addition of mobile code to Web pages; Java applets and JavaScript are popular examples. Code of this kind adds sophisticated interactive behaviour to Web documents, allowing more useful tasks to be performed. However, a key issue is security, since mobile code is downloaded from foreign hosts and executed locally.
Malicious or buggy code can attack a local host in three main ways (Brown 1996; Ousterhout et al. 1997 ):
• integrity attacks: attempts to delete or modify information in the local environment in unauthorised ways. For example, a program issues an operating system command to delete local files.
• privacy attacks: attempts to steal or leak information to unauthorised parties.
For example, a program reads a file and transmits the contents to another host.
• denial of service attacks: attempts to occupy resources to an extent which interferes with the normal operation of the host. An example is a program executing an infinite loop, resulting in CPU cycles wasted and a depleted heap space.
These attacks are only possible if a foreign program has unregulated access to local system resources such as the file system, network services (e.g., socket connections), CPU cycles, internal memory, input/output devices, the program environment (e.g., environment variables), and operating system commands. At the other extreme, a foreign program which is denied access to all resources cannot do any damage, but is unlikely to be able to do much useful work.
There is no one applicable policy for all foreign code: some code should be more trusted than others, and hence should be given more privileges. Providing a security model that provides the right level of functionality with the appropriate degree of security at the right time is a challenge. Indeed, security for mobile code is an active research area (Vitek and Tschudin 1997; Brown 1996; Cugola et al. 1997; Thorn 1997 ).
An emerging trend is the use of formal language semantics to reason with mobile code and prove security properties. For example, Leroy and Rouaix (1998) have developed formal techniques for validating a typed functional language with assignments, ensuring that memory locations always contain appropriate values. The use of a rewriting logic is advocated in (Meseguer and Talcott 1997) as the basis for a mobile code programming language where security properties can be formally verified. Volpano (1997) argues for the development of provably-secure programming languages which can be remotely evaluated, and whose semantics permit the formal proof of security properties. As reported in (Dean et al. 1996) , a number of security loopholes have been discovered with Java applets, and this seems related to its lack of a formal semantics. Recently, this weakness has been addressed by giving semantics to subsets of Java (Drossopoulou and Eisenbach 1998; Jensen et al. 1998) .
Declarative languages come with simple and elegant semantics, providing a convenient basis for reasoning about program execution and for introducing security mechanisms. This paper examines a security extension for a Prolog-based mobile code language called the LogicWeb language (Loke and Davison 1998a) . Underpinning the language is a view of the Web as a collection of logic programs called LogicWeb programs. LogicWeb clauses embedded within Web pages add logic programming behaviour to those pages. A LogicWeb program can retrieve and manipulate other Web pages (which may optionally contain embedded LogicWeb code themselves) using compositional logic programming techniques. Applications of LogicWeb include Web-based distributed deductive databases, and extending the semantics of Web links (Loke et al. 1996b; Loke et al. 1996a; Loke and Davison 1997) .
In this paper, we present a security model for LogicWeb which provides for the safe (i.e., host-protecting) execution of programs without overly restricting their capabilities. The key features of the model are:
• flexible: it supports varying degrees of trust and access to resources. More trusted programs can be given more privileges to achieve greater function-ality. Policies determine what resources are available to whom, and how the resources must be used.
• formally specified: the model provides a precise meaning of safety.
• implemented based on the model's specification: the implementation takes the form of a meta-interpreter which is closely allied to the underlying operational semantics.
The security model is specified as an extension of the operational semantics of the LogicWeb language, and so permits a straightforward proof that the model protects the host according to specified policies. We describe how meta-programming provides the necessary control over execution behaviour for a flexible yet safe execution environment, including control over resource usage and looping. We also show how security policies can support different trust levels, and how policies can be combined to control the execution of an application composed from programs with different trust levels. The security model is implemented as an extension of the system described in (Loke and Davison 1998b) .
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. §2 provides background on LogicWeb, §3 gives an overview of the security model, §4 describes how we utilise digital signatures, and §5 examines how security policies are specified. The need to combine security policies during goal evaluation is explained in §6. §7 describes how policies are enforced by policy programs. An implementation of the security model is given in §8. Control of resource usage using meta-interpreters is illustrated in §9. §10 reviews related work, and §11 concludes.
Preliminaries
This section gives an overview of LogicWeb programs, the language, and the architecture of the client-side LogicWeb system.
LogicWeb Programs
LogicWeb programs are constructed from the data returned by HEAD, GET or POST HTTP requests. When successful, a HEAD request returns meta-information about a page, whereas GET and POST requests return meta-information and Web pages. The LogicWeb program derived from a HEAD response consists of two types of facts for holding the page's meta-information and URL:
• about(FieldName, Value). about/2 facts store the page's meta-information as supplied by the server (e.g., the content length).
• actual url(URL). This holds the URL of the page whose meta-information was retrieved from the server. The actual URL would be different from the URL used in the original HTTP request if the request was redirected by the server.
The program corresponding to a HEAD response uses the identifier lw(head, URL). Programs corresponding to GET and POST responses use lw(get, URL) and lw(post(Data), URL) respectively. A GET or POST response is translated into five types of facts based on the meta-information returned by the page's server and the HTML text in the page. Additional LogicWeb clauses may also be included within the page.
The facts include about/2 and actual url/1 described above, and the following:
• my id(Type, URL). Type stores the type of the program, which is either the term get or post(Data). Data is the information posted to the CGI script at URL.
• h text(HTMLText). This contains the HTML text of the page (apart from any additional LogicWeb clauses).
• link(Label, URL). This stores a page's link information. For instance, the anchor:
...<A HREF="http://www.cs.mu.oz.au/">Melb. U</A>...
becomes:
link("Melb. U", "http://www.cs.mu.oz.au/").
Additional facts can be readily extracted from the text of the page, as described in (Loke and Davison 1998b) .
Clauses are included within a page between the tags "<LW CODE>" and "</LW CODE>". Typically, the code appears inside a verbatim container "<PRE>...</PRE>" or a comment container "<!--...-->" so that it is uninterpreted by the browser. Figure 1 shows a page holding LogicWeb clauses about research interests.
interested in/1 defines the author's interests using Prolog-style facts and rules. The LogicWeb operator "#>" evaluates the interested in/1 goal against the program identified by lw(get, URL).
Assuming that the page shown in Figure 1 was retrieved from http://www.cs.mu.oz.au/~swl/ using the GET method, then the resulting LogicWeb program contains:
1. Several about/2 facts concerning the page's meta-information. 2. actual url("http://www.cs.mu.oz.au/~swl/"). 3. my id(get,"http://www.cs.mu.oz.au/~swl/"). 4. h text("<HTML>...</HTML>"). This fact stores all the HTML text from the page except the clauses between the "<LW CODE>" and "</LW CODE>" tags. 5. Two link/2 facts:
link("Department of Computer Science", "http://www.cs.mu.oz.au/"). link("University of Melbourne", "http://www.unimelb.edu.au/").
6. The clauses between the "<LW CODE>" and "</LW CODE>" tags.
A LogicWeb application comprises a set of LogicWeb programs, with one singled out (by the programmer) as the main program. Each application has an identity which is the program identifier of the main program, and a visible interface with <HTML> <HEAD> <TITLE>Seng Wai Loke's Home Page</TITLE> </HEAD> <BODY><H1>Seng Wai Loke's Home Page</H1> I'm from the<A HREF="http://www.cs.mu.oz.au/"> Department of Computer Science</A> at the <A HREF="http://www.unimelb.edu.au/"> University of Melbourne</A>. <!--<LW_CODE> interests(["Logic Programming", "AI", "Web", "Agents"]).
friend_page("http://www.cs.mu.oz.au/~f1/"). friend_page("http://www.cs.mu.oz.au/~f2").
interested_in(X) :-interests(Is), member(X, Is). interested_in(X) :-friend_page(URL), lw(get, URL)#>interested_in(X). </LW_CODE> --> </BODY> </HTML> 
The LogicWeb Language
The LogicWeb language utilises Prolog and special LogicWeb operators. We will assume that the reader is familiar with Prolog, and concentrate instead on the operators.
LogicWeb Operators
A LogicWeb goal is formed using the operator "#>", which is known as context switching. For example, the LogicWeb goal lw(get, URL)#>Goal applies Goal to the program specified by the lw(get, URL) identifier.
If the program is not already present on the client-side, then its page will be downloaded and translated into a LogicWeb program before the query is evaluated. However, if the program is present, then the goal is executed immediately. Thus, the "#>" operator permits the programmer to think of Web computation as goals applied to programs, with no need for explicit Web page retrieval, parsing, or storage.
The current context of a LogicWeb goal, i.e. the program (or composition of programs) where the goal is located, is ignored when "#>" is evaluated.
LogicWeb programs can be manipulated using five LW-composition operators. Four are based on Brogi's algebraic program composition framework (Brogi 1993) , and the fifth on reduce from functional programming. The operators are: LW-union ("+"), LW-intersection ("*"), LW-restriction ("/"), LW-encapsulation ("@"), and LW-reduce ("<>"). An expression formed with LW-composition operators is called a program expression.
LogicWeb programs are composed together after they have been retrieved from the Web, which means that the semantics of the operators can be viewed as a variant of Brogi's definitions, extended to address issues related to page downloading and the translation of pages to programs. The operational semantics are specified in §2.2.3.
The sixth operator, the context operator, denoted by "(#)", represents the current context in a program expression. For instance:
?-lw(get, "URL0")#>(((#) + lw(get, "URL1"))#>interested_in(X)).
"(#)" is instantiated to lw(get, "URL0") when the goal is evaluated. "(#)" can be used in place of a program identifier in any expression, which provides very useful expressive power. For instance, it can readily model other composition formalisms (Loke and Davison 1998a) .
EBNF Syntax
A pure LogicWeb program is a finite set of clauses of the form [∀x](A :-G) where G is defined recursively as:
E defines LogicWeb program expressions:
defines a Prolog list of items, each of which is described by a nonterminal I. U RL is a URL, and F a query attribute submitted to a CGI script. N ame is the name of a query attribute, and V alue is the value submitted to the server for the corresponding attribute. The context operator "(#)" can appear anywhere a program identifier can, but must be instantiated to a program identifier when used as the right-hand argument of LW-restriction.
Operational Semantics
The operational semantics of the LogicWeb language is detailed in (Loke and Davison 1998a) , but so that this paper is self-contained, the semantics are summarised here. In particular, we do not consider LW-restriction and LW-reduce.
An oracle function is defined to model the accessing of LogicWeb programs.
Definition 2.1 (oracle function)
The oracle function download : LW P rogramIDs → LW P rograms ∪ {⊥} takes a LogicWeb program identifier P (of the form defined by P), and returns the program D P if it is successfully created. Failure to obtain a program is represented by returning the symbol ⊥.
download attempts to download a HTTP response object and translate it into a LogicWeb program in the way specified in §2.1.
The set of downloaded programs is extended by calling the function add programs, which takes the set of existing LogicWeb programs and maps it to a new set using download. 
where ids is a function that takes a set of programs and returns the identifiers of the programs in the set, i.e. ids(S) is the set of identifiers of the programs in S.
A derivation relation involving the set of downloaded LogicWeb programs specifies the computation model involving interactions with the Web. A context is defined for each node in a top-down derivation whose label is of the form "S, E ⊢
In the rules, P denotes single program identifiers of the form P, and E and F denote program expressions of the form E as defined in §2.2.2. L (I) denotes a list of the form L I . ǫ denotes the empty (identity) substitution.
The following rules define derivation in pure Prolog taking into account the creation of LogicWeb programs:
true is always derivable in any program expression E without any change to the set of created programs.
Conjunction.

S, E ⊢
S ′ , which may or may not be the same as S, is the result of Web interactions from G 1 's derivation. The result of these interactions are propagated to G 2 by starting the derivation of G 2 θ with S ′ . Since G 2 θ started with S ′ , S ′′ is the result of Web interactions during the derivation of the conjunction.
Atomic formula.
Obtaining clauses from E can involve the creation of new programs due to LW-encapsulation (see rule (8)), and so, S is changed to S ′ . The proof of the body starts with the computed program set S ′ and returns the new set S ′′ and the answer substitution δ.
Obtaining clauses from a single program.
The answer substitution is ǫ, and there is no change to S.
Below, we present the rules for choosing clauses from LW-union, LW-intersection, LW-encapsulation, and context switching.
LW-union.
A clause is chosen from a LW-union E+F by choosing a clause from either E or F .
LW-intersection.
A clause H:-G is obtained from the LW-intersection E*F if there exists a clause H 1 :-G 1 in E and a clause H 2 :-G 2 in F such that H unifies with H 1 and H 2 , and G = (G 1 , G 2 ). This rule utilises a left-to-right ordering in choosing clauses from E*F . Rules are first chosen from E returning S ′ , and then, S ′ is used when selecting clauses from F ending up with S ′′ .
LW-encapsulation.
A clause A:-true is obtained from the encapsulation of E, @E, if A is provable in E. LogicWeb programs can be created in the proof of A, i.e. a new program set S ′ is computed starting with S.
Context Switching. We first define the function expids : P rogramExpressions → ℘(LW P rogramIDs)
to refer to the program identifiers within a program expression. expids is defined recursively based on the syntax of program expressions:
expids(E)
In the above, we have used ∈ to represent list membership, and a
We also define the function:
insertCC : P rogramExpressions×P rogramExpressions → P rogramExpressions which substitutes every occurrence of the operator (#) in a program expression (the first argument) with the current context (the second argument):
The rule defining context switching is the following:
where F ′ = insertCC(F, E), I = expids(F ), and S ′ = add programs(S, I). The rule states that the goal F #> G is provable in E starting with the program set S if the goal G is provable in F ′ starting with the updated program set S ′ which contains all the programs mentioned in I (and hence, in F ).
The LogicWeb System Architecture
The architecture of the LogicWeb system (its components and data-flows) is shown in Figure 2 . • a graphical user interface (GUI);
• an engine for processing user queries; • a page loader and (page to program) translator; and • a store of LogicWeb programs.
The Prolog engine consists of three components: the query processing engine, the program store, and the page loader and translator. The query processing engine consists of the LogicWeb program interpreter (see §8.1) and predicates to translate user actions into the evaluation of specific goals in LogicWeb programs. Downloaded LogicWeb programs are stored inside the program store (actually as facts in a SWI-Prolog database). The page loader and translator consist of predicates which download and parse HTML documents to extract the clauses making up LogicWeb programs.
The system converts a user action (i.e., link selection or form submission) into a query. It computes the result of the query with respect to a program by invoking the LogicWeb interpreter. Processing of the query may result in other pages being downloaded and translated into LogicWeb programs. When query processing ends, the system formats the result and shows it to the user via the browser.
The above architecture has been implemented using the NCSA Mosaic browser and SWI-Prolog (for the Prolog engine). The two are integrated with Mosaic's Com-mon Client Interface (CCI) API (Loke and Davison 1998b) . This implementation is extended in §8.
Overview of the Security Model
The LogicWeb security model assumes the following about the downloading and execution of programs:
• Program source is downloaded. Since the local host receives the source rather than a compiled form (e.g., binaries or bytecode), each goal is visible at the interpreter level. Also, if the source is unencrypted then it is open to tampering -it may be intercepted during transmission and modified.
• Downloaded programs are executed by an interpreter based on the operational semantics presented earlier. Such an interpreter is described in (Loke and Davison 1998b) , and is extended in §8.
• A LogicWeb program can invoke goals in other programs. Therefore, the model must handle communication between programs possessing different levels of trust. A less trusted program should not be able to use the privileges of a more trusted program.
We have adopted a sandbox model, where each program is executed in a controlled space, limiting its access to resources and controlling the resources used. A sandbox for a LogicWeb program consists of its interpreter and a security policy, or policy for short, which controls the program's utilisation of system resources. A less trusted LogicWeb program is assigned a policy which restricts resource usage, while a more trusted program is granted a more liberal policy. Security policies are defined by each user of the LogicWeb system.
A LogicWeb program accesses the local environment and system resources via system calls, which are SWI-Prolog and LogicWeb built-in predicates. LogicWeb built-ins include predicates for displaying pages, constructing and parsing HTML documents, fast string matching, checking if a particular program exists in the program store, and deleting programs from the program store.
A policy specifies what system calls are permitted, and the ways they can be used. This information is encoded as a set of predicates in a policy program created by the LogicWeb system user. A policy program also states what programs can be utilised via context switching. Policy programs may be stored at remote sites or locally as long as they are protected from tampering. They can be integrated into the system using the same downloading mechanism as the rest of the LogicWeb system, including the use of composition to combine policies.
Assignment of policies to LogicWeb programs is owner-based. The choice of policy program assigned to a LogicWeb program is determined by how much the LogicWeb program is trusted which, in turn, depends on the owner of the program. The owner is identified by a mechanism external to the LogicWeb language, by authenticating the LogicWeb program using a PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) digital signature (Garfinkel 1995) .
Policy programs restrict the use of system calls, thereby preventing integrity and privacy attacks. Denial-of-service attacks are addressed by controlling the use of resources using policy programs (as shown in §9.1) and meta-interpreters (discussed in §9.2).
Digital Signatures for LogicWeb Programs
Information can be encrypted in PGP using a secret private key, and decrypted using a corresponding public key which is distributed publically. PGP keys are used for authentication in the following way. Suppose A encrypts a message and sends it to B. B wants to ensure that the encrypted message is really from A, and that the message has not been tampered with. To do this, B attempts to decrypt the message using A's public key. If the decryption succeeds, it means that the message was encrypted using A's private key and that it has not been modified. Also, since the key is only known to A, the message must have come from A. If the decryption fails, B cannot conclude that A encrypted the message.
PGP keys can also be used to sign documents or programs. Figure 3 shows the use of a digital signature when downloading a program from A to B, and the process of assigning a policy program. A PGP digital signature is created by first mapping the program to a string (actually, a single large number) using the MD5 algorithm (Garfinkel 1995) , which almost uniquely identifies the message.
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The MD5 string is then encrypted using the sender's private key, and this encrypted MD5 string becomes the digital signature. The receiver of a signed program (the program and its signature) uses the sender's public key to decrypt the signature, producing the original MD5 string and the PGP ID. The receiver then checks that the program corresponds to the MD5 string, i.e. the program has not been modified in any way, and assigns a policy to the program by consulting a database maintained in the system which maps PGP IDs to policy program IDs. Note that the system uses three kinds of IDs: PGP IDs, policy program IDs and IDs of an application's LogicWeb programs, and that since policy programs are LogicWeb programs, policy program IDs are LogicWeb program IDs. Unsigned programs, or programs where authentication failed, should not be trusted, and are given restricted access to system resources. The system stores the downloaded program, and records the policy assignment for later use in query evaluation. Policy programs not already present in the system are downloaded during query evaluation. §8 provides details on policy assignment and use.
A digital signature proves who sent the program, and that the program was not altered either by error or design. The signature also provides non-repudiation, which means that the sender cannot easily disavow his signature on the program.
One reason for using an MD5 string is that it is faster to encrypt and decrypt than the entire program. Also, since the program is not encrypted, the program source is available even if authentication fails, and so can still be executed (though with limited privileges). However, if program confidentiality is required during transmission, the code can be encrypted. We utilise PGP since it is difficult to break, equipped with public and private keys generation, widely available, supported on a range of operating system platforms, and one of the most popular encryption techniques. PGP public keys can be obtained either through personal communication between the LogicWeb system user and program owners, or via the Web: PGP public keys are increasingly being placed on homepages, where they can be readily retrieved by the LogicWeb system. The distribution of PGP keys is discussed further in §11.
Specifying Security Policies
A LogicWeb program accesses system resources via system calls and context switching. The resources used via context switching are socket connections for downloading pages and local storage for programs.
A policy program defines three predicates for controlling the system calls and context switching of its designated LogicWeb programs. The predicates are:
• valid program(Type, URL): this predicate specifies the LogicWeb programs which can be used via context switching. For example, restricting programs to those from the domain www.cs.mu.oz.au is given by:
valid_program(get, URL) :-contains(URL, "http://www.cs.mu.oz.au/").
The following query will fail when using that policy since the goal refers to an invalid domain:
?-lw(get, "http://www.cs.rmit.edu.au/")#>h_text(Src).
• valid systemCall(Call): this predicate defines the set of system calls a program is allowed to invoke. Call is a term representing the form the system call may take.
• call system(Call): this predicate is a wrapper for the allowed predicates defined by valid systemCall/1. Call is a term representing the goal which is to be invoked in a special way. Typically, call system/1 is used to implement more restrictive versions of system calls.
The difference between valid systemCall/1 and call system/1 is execution. Call patterns specified in valid systemCall/1 are used to test system calls, rejecting ones which do not match the necessary requirements. call system/1 is used to execute system calls in novel (usually restricted) ways. A policy program could be written with the body code of valid systemCall/1 implemented in call system/1, doing away with the need for the valid systemCall/1 predicate. However, the distinction between testing and execution would then be much less clear.
The following policy program permits the retrieval (using the GET FileName must be an atom, Mode either read or write, and Stream a variable. Type checking increases the robustness of the system by preventing instantiation faults when the arguments are the wrong type.
We briefly consider two examples that show the flexibility of security policies.
A Historical Policy
State information can be used to implement a history-based policy. For example, the following policy lets a program carry out context switching (i.e. execute goals such as lw(get, URL)#>Goal) until a file is accessed. A file access is detected by having call system/1 monitor open/3 calls. Once open/3 has been called, file accessed/1 will be changed to hold the value yes. This will cause subsequent calls to valid program/2 to fail, disabling context switching for the program.
Levels of Trust
It is straightforward to build policies with varying levels of trust for different programs. In the following example we use three levels: dangerous, ok, and safe. A 'dangerous' program cannot download any programs, or execute any system calls. An 'ok' program can download programs but it can only write to the directory /tmp and cannot use system/1 to delete files. A 'safe' program has no restrictions placed upon it, except that a message is printed out when a file deletion succeeds. Each level of trust is represented by a separate policy program.
The policy program for 'dangerous':
Any call that uses system resources will fail. The policy program for 'ok' is given as: We could call report deletion/1 in valid systemCall/1 but reporting a file deletion has nothing to do with testing the validity of a system call; it is a diagnostic associated with execution.
Combining Security Policies
A LogicWeb program must not be allowed to perform an illegal system operation by invoking a goal in a more privileged program. Hence, the security model must ensure the following: 1. Context switching must not transfer privileges between programs. The system has to ensure that an untrusted program does not illegally access resources by invoking a goal in a trusted program. For example, assume that a program P is not allowed to read a file (as determined by its policy) while another program Q can (as determined by Q's policy). This means that P should not be able to call a goal like Q#>read file(Contents) to read a file. Clearly, it is too simplistic to validate a call to read file/1 in Q using only the policy of Q; the policy of P must also be considered. In a similar manner, a LogicWeb goal cannot be allowed to perform an illegal system operation because it is invoked in a trusted program. For example, if A can read a file which B can not, then the goal B#>read file(Contents) invoked in A should fail. This means that although A uses B, A should not pass its privileges to B, since the system trusts A but not B. Hence, the policies of both A and B must be consulted to determine if a read file/1 call should be allowed, as Figure 4 illustrates. When more than two programs are involved, a similar but slightly more complex situation arises. For example, consider a goal B#>(C#>G) invoked in the program A, where G is a system call. If G is allowed by the policies of A and C, but B does not permit G, then B is performing an illegal system operation through C. Essentially, disregarding any one of the policies potentially allows an illegal system operation. This means that to determine if G should be allowed, all the policy programs used by the code must be considered. Figure 5 shows the changes in goal evaluation contexts starting from the goal B#>(C#>G) in program A and ending with goal G in C. The policies of all the programs involved in the evaluation of the goal starting from the first program (i.e., A) are required. Hence, the proof rules for the security model must incorporate a notion of the current set of policy programs which grows as goal evaluation progresses. 
LW-compositions must not transfer privileges between programs. A LogicWeb
program can invoke the clauses of another program in a LW-composition. For example, consider a goal G evaluated in the LW-composition of programs S and T: (S + T)#>G. G's evaluation may utilise some clauses from S and some from T, so in general G must be allowed by both the policies for S and T.
The observations made above can be made more formal by restating them using the LW-encapsulation and LW-intersection operators (@ and *). Namely, given a set of policies (e.g., {P,Q}), the allowable set of system calls and downloads are those permitted by the composition @P * @Q.
LW-encapsulation is used to express that each policy must separately validate the system calls and downloads. LW-intersection is used to represent that a given system call or download must be permitted by every policy program. For example, an open/3 call is permitted by both P and Q when the following goal succeeds:
?-(@P * @Q)#>valid_systemCall(open(_,_,_)).
Enforcing Security Policies
This section defines a new derivation relation, extending the operational semantics in §2.2.3 to use policy programs. Previously, a goal was evaluated in the current context, with the current set of created programs. In the new derivation relation, we also consider the current set of policy programs. The derivation relation is extended as follows:
For any goal formula G and program expression E,
denotes the fact that there exists a top-down derivation of G in E starting with the set S of existing LogicWeb programs and the ordered set of policy programs Σ, and ending with the computed answer substitution θ and created program set S ′ .
The proof rules which define this new relation are an extension of the rules in §2.2.3. Rules (1) to (8) are modified to form corresponding rules for the new derivation relation by using the following syntactic mapping:
Replace every occurrence of an expression involving the derivation relation:
S, E ⊢ S ′ θ G with the corresponding expression:
For instance, the following rule is obtained by applying this mapping to rule (2) (conjunction):
The same set of policy programs Σ is used for each of the conjuncts since they occur in the same rule (and hence, in the same program).
Mapping from Programs to Policies
To aid the discussion which follows, two functions are defined: one maps a LogicWeb program to its policy program, and the other relates a set of LogicWeb programs to their policy programs. Φ denotes the set of all policy programs used by the system. A policy program is permitted free access to system resources, and is not itself assigned a policy program.
Definition 7.1 (policy program assignment) The function pol : (LW P rogramIDs \ ids(Φ)) → Φ takes a program identifier (which is not that of a policy program) and returns a policy program for that program from Φ.
pol is not defined on policy programs, and the empty program ξ is not assigned a policy program.
Definition 7.2 (policies for a set of programs)
The function pols : ℘(LW P rogramIDs \ ids(Φ)) → ℘(Φ) takes a set of (non-policy) program identifiers I and returns the set of policy programs assigned to the programs in I. pols is defined by:
Context Switching Revisited
*Σ
@ denotes the LW-intersection of the LW-encapsulation of the policy programs in Σ (i.e., if Σ = {P 1 , ..., P n } then *Σ @ = @P 1 *...* @P n ), and G denotes a goal.
Evaluating a goal against *Σ @ has the effect of evaluating the goal against each program in Σ separately.
The new definition of the context switching rule (9) is:
The new rule has been augmented with:
i. A test to determine if each non-policy program to be used in the new context is allowed by the current set of policy programs Σ. The test is done by invoking the predicate valid program/2 in *Σ @ for each such non-policy program identified by lw(Typei, URLi) using a goal of the form:
N is the number of program identifiers in expids(F ′ ) \ ids(Φ). A LogicWeb goal is used when evaluating the valid program/2 goals in order to download the policy programs. Note that goal evaluation fails if not all the policy programs are downloaded. Also, a policy program can invoke non-policy programs in its rules, and the evaluation of the valid program/2 goals begins with an empty policy program set. The rule for the case where Σ is empty is given below. Note that we test all the programs in F ′ = insertCC(F, E) instead of F , which means that we test the programs in the current context as well.
ii. An extension of Σ with new policy programs. New policy programs are added to the front (left) of the ordered set Σ:
The last (rightmost) program in the ordered set is, chronologically, the first policy program, and its significance is explained below.
The following variant of the context switching rule caters for when Σ is empty. In that case, no policy programs are employed, no checks are made:
In (i), we applied valid program/2 to all the programs used in the goal's program expression and all the programs in the current context. We illustrate why by considering an example: valid_program(get, 'A'). valid_program(get, 'B'). valid_program(get, 'C') :-fail.
% may be omitted but added for clarity
If the goal ((A+B)*C)#>G is used in A then we would expect it to fail since A is not permitted to use B in context switching. Suppose instead that the goal was ((#)*C)#>G and the current context (as represnted by #) was A+B. The goal is equivalent to the earlier one; should it be permitted or not? If the goal is analysed by testing only C and ignoring the current context, then A would be allowed to use B in context switching, so violating A's policy. However, this behaviour appears harmless since B must already have been retrieved if it is in the current context, and so its utilisation will require no additional resources.
This would not be the case if the semantics of add programs in Definition 2.2 were different. Suppose that A's use of B did result in the retrieval of a new version of B, then resources would be used. Or suppose that programs are only retrieved when their clauses are actually needed, and so B may not have been retrieved at the time of G's evaluation.
By conservatively testing the current context, we stay faithful to A's policy: A cannot use B via context switching, regardless of whether B is downloaded. This design is more general since it makes the security model more tolerant of changes in the system's download and storage mechanisms. Also, the intention of A's policy is arguably to unconditionally bar A from using B via context switching.
We could easily implement the less conservative view: namely that A cannot use B via context switching, unless B is already downloaded (or in the current context). A's policy program would become:
valid_program(get, 'A'). valid_program(get, 'B'). valid_program(get, 'C') :-program_exists('B').
program exists/1 is a LogicWeb built-in which succeeds if the specified program is in the local cache.
System Call Rules
Two new rules called system call rules are added to specify how policy programs are utilised with system calls. The first rule specifies a test to determine if a goal is a valid system call. It invokes call system/1 in the last policy program in Σ, which is the policy for the main program of the application. This means that any state changes carried out by call system/1 (for instance, see the example in §5.1) will be done in the main program's policy program.
Substitutions resulting from calling valid systemCall/1 are discarded. Instead, the substitutions computed from call system/1 are kept. As before, proofs occurring in policy programs proceed with an empty policy program set. For the case where Σ = ∅, the rule is
A call to a built-in predicate in the module built ins is represented by:
G succeeds with θ ∅, S, E ⊢ S θ built ins:(G)
The evaluation of the goal is outside the scope of the inference rules, but θ is assumed to be the computed answer substitution.
Properties of the Inference Rules
We show how the inference rules disallow illegal system operations. First, context sequence and illegal system operation are defined. Goal derivation involving LogicWeb goals may result in several sequences of context switches, each represented by a sequence of contexts. For example, the sequence of contexts in Figure 5 is:
A, B, C
Note that the only operational semantic rules which change the context are the context switching rules (i.e. 9'a and 9'b).
Definition 7.3 (context sequence)
Given a sequence of applications of inference rules in a top-down derivation, suppose that there are n − 1 applications of the context switching rules. Further suppose that the ith application of these rules causes the context to switch from E i to E i+1 , where 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. The context sequence is the sequence of contexts E 1 , . . . , E n .
Informally, given a context sequence E 1 , . . . , E n , an illegal system operation is performed in the context E i if a system call, or the use of a program in context switching, is disallowed by the policy of some program in E i , but is attempted in E i or some later context.
Definition 7.4 (illegal system operation)
Given a context sequence E 1 , . . . , E n , for some E i , P ∈ pols(expids(E i ) \ ids(Φ)), i ≤ j ≤ n, and system call G, an illegal system operation is performed in E i if the goal call system(G) is invoked when the context of G is E j but ∅, S, P ⊢ The context switching rules guarantee that all policy programs which must be consulted during a derivation are present.
Lemma 7.1 Given the context sequence E 1 , . . . , E n for a top-down derivation, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, at the node with context E i , the current set of policy programs Σ contains the policy programs of all the non-policy programs occurring in E 1 , . . . , E i .
Proof
The proof is by induction on i. For i = 1, the goal evaluation starts in the empty program ξ with Σ = ∅. For i ≥ 2, (by the inductive hypothesis) when the goal is evaluated in E i−1 , Σ contains the policy programs of all the non-policy programs occurring in E 1 , . . . , E i−1 . E i−1 changes to E i using one of the context switching rules. This rule updates Σ (say, to Σ ′ ) by adding to Σ the policy programs of the nonpolicy programs occurring in E i . Hence, the goal evaluation continues in E i with Σ ′ containing all the policy programs for the non-policy programs in E 1 , . . . , E i .
The theorem below implies soundness of the security model: all goals which have a successful derivation have the desired security property of not performing an illegal system operation.
Theorem 7.1 (safety property) No illegal system operation is performed in any context during a top-down derivation using the above rules.
Proof Given the context sequence E 1 , . . . , E n , for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, suppose that an illegal system operation was performed in E i , say when the current context was E j , where i ≤ j ≤ n, the set of policy programs was Σ, and the set of created programs was S. To perform this operation either (1) the system call rule for Σ = ∅ or (2) the new context switching rule for Σ = ∅ must have been used. In case (1), according to the definition of the system call rule used, since call system(G) was invoked, the goal:
In case (2), suppose that the LogicWeb goal was F #>G and F ′ = insertCC(F, E j ), and the oracle function was called on the identifier
, then according to the definition of the context switching rule used, the goal:
must have succeeded. But by the definition of an illegal system operation, for some P ∈ pols(expids(E i ) \ ids(Φ)), in case (1), ∅, T, P ⊢ T ′ θ valid systemCall(G) does not hold for any T , T ′ , and θ, and in case (2), ∅, T, P ⊢ T ′ θ valid program(Type, URL) does not hold for any T , T ′ , and θ. In either case, it must have been that P ∈ Σ. By the above lemma, Σ contains the policy programs of all the non-policy programs occurring in E 1 , . . . , E j , namely, Σ ⊇ pols(expids(E i ) \ ids(Φ)). This means P ∈ Σ, and hence there is a contradiction.
Implementation
Interpreter with Security Mechanisms
The inference rules presented above provide the basis for an interpreter for evaluating goals in the presence of policy programs. Program 1 shows this interpreter, which is an extension of the one described in (Loke and Davison 1998b) . 
Program 1. (Continued)
demo/3 is derived from a standard vanilla Prolog meta-interpreter (Sterling and Beer 1989; Sterling and Shapiro 1994) , and executes a goal (the third argument of demo/3) against its program context (the second argument). The first argument of demo/3 stores the IDs of downloaded policy programs.
In the first clause of demo/3, establish context/6 returns the new policy program identifiers for the programs in the new context. The second clause checks for and invokes an allowed system call. In allowed systemCall/2, valid systemCall/1 is invoked in each policy program. Policy programs known to the system are recorded in pgpID to policyID/2, which is described below. invoke systemCall/2 invokes the system call in the last program mentioned in the list of policy program identifiers (PL). This is the policy program for the main program, as mentioned earlier.
The third clause of demo/3 allows policy programs to invoke goals in the Prolog module built ins.
The last three clauses of demo/3 implement the basic meta-interpreter. select clause/3 in the final clause evaluates the goal A by looking for a suitable clause (A :-B) from the programs defined by the program expression E. The clauses of downloaded programs are held in the program store (see Figure 2 ) in the format lw(Type,URL)::(Clause).
The interpreter is called using a goal such as:
?-demo([], empty, lw(get, "http://main.program")#>query).
Goal derivation begins with the empty context without any policy programs and a goal where lw(get, "http://main.program") is the main program of an application. establish context/6 carries out several tasks. One of these is to expand the program expression F (which was part of a context switching goal F #>G), so that any context operators (#) in F are replaced by the current context. This results in a new program expression F1. Note that two copies of the original list of policy programs is passed into establish context/6 initially. The fourth and fifth arguments of establish context/6 represent the current extended list and the newly extended list respectively. Because the current extended list may not be the original and the security tests are done using the original, the extra copy is supplied.
The last two clauses of establish context/6 relate to the security model. The penultimate clause checks a new program ID against the existing policies, and may download a new policy for that program, which causes the list of policies IDs (PL) to be extended. allowed program/2 checks a program ID (lw(T,U)) against the existing policies by calling valid program/2 against each policy in turn. This mimics the LWintersection of LW-encapsulated policies described earlier.
add policyID/3 attempts to retrieve a policy ID for the specified program ID (lw(T,U)), and add it to the policy IDs list. This process is complicated by the possibility that the program ID may actually be a policy ID, which is ascertained by checking it against pgpID to policyID/2. However, if lw(T,U) is an ordinary LogicWeb program ID, then policyID/2 will contain a mapping from the program ID to its matching policy ID. How this is achieved will be explained shortly.
The final clause of establish context/6 checks all the programs in the current context against the existing policies. This check is required only once, but for simplicity, we have permitted the code to perform this check every time a context operator (#) is encountered in a program expression.
pgpID_to_policyID('Seng W. Loke <swloke@cs.mu.oz.au>', lw(get, "http://www.cs.mu.oz.au/~swloke/my_policy.html").
The first argument is Seng Wai Loke's PGP ID, and the second a policy program identifier.
If the downloaded LogicWeb program is not signed then determine policyID/3 makes use of the default policy ID associated with the 'unknown' signature ID: pgpID_to_policyID(unknown, lw(get, "http://www.cs.mu.oz.au/~swloke/default_policy.html").
Back in assign policyID/3, the policy ID returned by determine policyID/3 is passed to record policyID/3. It asserts a policyID/2 fact which has as its first argument the LogicWeb program ID and its second is the matching policy ID. This fact can be used subsequently to map from a program ID to its policy. The fact is not asserted into the LogicWeb program itself since it must be impossible for a rogue program to redefine policyID/2.
Control of Resource Usage
This section considers denial-of-service attacks by showing how it is possible to control an operation or resource with policy programs and meta-interpreters.
Resource Control Using Policy Programs
Resource usage can be monitored by keeping contextual or state information within a policy program, allowing decisions about the utilisation of resources to be based on the execution history. For example, a limit can be imposed on the frequency of system calls.
The following definition of call system/1 permits up to ten files to be opened at a time, thereby limiting the number of allocated file descriptors. meta-interpreters which monitor/control different aspects of the computation. Other loop checking techniques are studied in (Bol 1991) .
Resource Limits
The techniques from the last section can be easily utilised to monitor resource limits. We will measure two resources: the number of LogicWeb programs downloaded, and the number of clause applications. The first count will persist across different solve t/2 invocations, the second will be reset at each invocation of solve t/2.
The necessary terminate/1 clauses for these measures are:
terminate(invoked_builtin(download(_,_))) :-program_count(N), N > 100, % permit up to 100 program downloads write('maximum LogicWeb program count exceeded'). terminate(invoked_builtin(clause(_,_))) :-retract(clause_count(N)), N1 is N + 1, assert(clause_count(N1)), (N > 500 -> % permit up to 500 clause applications writef('maximum clause count exceeded') ; !, fail ).
This code assumes that solve ad/2 can deal with built-in predicates, which would require a minor extension to Program 2.
The first terminate/1 clause monitors program downloads by looking for calls to the download/2 built-in. When there is such a call, program count/1 is checked to see if the number of programs downloaded exceeds 100. If it does then execution is terminated. The use of program count/1 would require a change to create program/3 (called by download/2) which translates a page into a program; it would also have to increment program count/1 each time a new program was created.
The second terminate/1 clause restricts the number of clause applications by monitoring calls to the clause/2 built-in. The terminate/1 clause increments the number stored in clause count/1 until it exceeds 500.
An oft-stated problem with nested meta-interpreters is the penalty incurred upon execution speed. In fact, the termination checks described here could be implemented more efficiently by directly modifying demo/3. However, multiple metainterpreters are less complex to understand than a single, monolithic piece of code. Also, they permit a compositional approach to implementing execution control: functionality is separately implemented and introduced. We also believe that the speed costs are relatively unimportant if the application carries out frequent Web requests, and hence spends most of its wall-clock execution time interacting with the Web. Moreover, partial reduction techniques for translating meta-interpreters into specialised forms can be explored to remove the levels of interpretation (Sterling and Shapiro 1994).
Comparisons with Security Models in Other Mobile Code Systems
We review security models which share certain common features with LogicWeb. First, we consider security approaches in some interpreted languages, and then examine systems which utilise policy modules and authentication.
Security Models in Two Interpreted Languages
Safe-Tcl
Tcl is an interpreted imperative language, and access to system resources is via permitted commands of the interpreter. In the Safe-Tcl security model (Ousterhout et al. 1997) , security is enforced by making dangerous commands unavailable to scripts running in the safe interpreter. Potentially dangerous operations, such as opening sockets, can be carried out via wrappers or aliases. The wrappers ensure that the commands are used in a controlled manner (e.g., only socket connections to some hosts are permitted).
The security model in LogicWeb is partly motivated by the Safe-Tcl approach: LogicWeb's valid system calls correspond to Safe-Tcl commands, and call system/1 corresponds to wrappers for those commands. A safe interpreter in Safe-Tcl corresponds to the LogicWeb program interpreter with appropriate policy programs. However, the Safe-Tcl security model has no notion of authentication.
Safe-Tcl allows programs running in different interpreters (each with its own security policy) to communicate. Such communication effectively composes the security policies of the programs, i.e. a program can use the privileges of other programs. The dangers of this are highlighted in (Ousterhout et al. 1997 ), but not solved in a structured way. In LogicWeb, the composition of policies do not violate safety criteria.
Java Applets
A Java applet is transmitted in bytecode format, and then executed by an interpreter on the local host. This contrasts with Safe-Tcl and LogicWeb where source code is transferred.
The LogicWeb system does not support concurrency or sophisticated GUI programming, and so its security model does not need to deal with multi-threading or screen resources (e.g., windows). The Java language enforces type safety by having the compiler ensure that class methods do not access memory in ways that are inappropriate for their type (Sun Microsystems, Inc 1997) . LogicWeb programs are not explicitly typed and there is no class abstraction. However, type conversions (e.g., strings to atoms) are done via system calls, and so the dangers of type conversion are avoided at call time. There are two trust levels for classes in the current Java security model: trusted classes are local and part of the Java system, while untrusted classes are ones that are downloaded. Multiple levels of trust are possible with signed LogicWeb programs.
Security for Java applets, as implemented in Microsoft's Internet Explorer 3.0 and Netscape Navigator 3.0, disallows applets from reading from or writing to local files, or establishing network connections except to the originating host. However, there are ways around these problems, including the use of server-side databases and proxy servers. The digital signing of JAR (Java ARchive) files, as supported in JDK 1.1.5 2 , bundles Java code and related files together into one file (Sun Microsystems, Inc 1997) . In a similar way, a collection of programs making up a LogicWeb application can be bundled, signed, and transported as one archive file.
Microsoft Internet Explorer 4.0 now allows finer grained control over the capabilities granted to Java code, such as access rights to local files and network connections (Microsoft Corporation 1999a; Microsoft Corporation 1999b) . This is done by including a list of capabilities requested by the applet in the applet's signature. Approval for the capabilities are either pre-set or given via user dialog. The implementation prevents transfer of privileges between classes in a similar way to our model: if a class has not been directly granted a capability, it cannot obtain that capability regardless of its caller's capabilities. A class without a capability cannot gain that capability by invoking a more privileged class.
Security Policy Modules in Two Mobile Code Systems
SERC's Safer Erlang (SSErl)
The security mechanism in LogicWeb was motivated by the policy modules used in SSErl, a functional declarative language for programming concurrent and distributed systems (Brown 1997a; Brown 1997b ). In the SSErl framework, a policy module is not associated with a particular program as in LogicWeb, but with a SSErl node, a platform where multiple processes may run concurrently. System operations are performed via built-in functions. A policy module specifies the allowable built-in functions for all the processes running at a node.
In contrast to SSErl, execution of LogicWeb programs is single-threaded, although the thread of execution can proceed from one program to another. At any one time, at most one LogicWeb application is running. The overall policy for the running application is represented by the current set of policy programs, and is determined dynamically since it is generally not possible to determine a priori which programs an application will use.
Java Aglets
The Aglet workbench (Karjoth et al. 1997) allows Java programs (called aglets) to be transferred between hosts as mobile agents. A specialised language for writ-ing aglet security policy modules has been proposed which makes use of specific roles such as the aglet's manufacturer, owner, execution platform (e.g., the URL of the host), and domain. In the LogicWeb implementation, the assignment of policy programs is currently based solely on a program's signature (as implemented by determine policyID/3 in §8.2).
Authentication in Two Mobile Code Systems
Agent Tcl
Programs are authenticated with PGP in Agent Tcl (Gray 1996) . PGP is invoked externally in the same way as in LogicWeb, thereby keeping the Agent Tcl system simpler and more flexible (the encryption mechanism can be easily replaced). Depending on the identity of the agent's owner, an Agent Tcl program is assigned resources such as CPU time, windows, the file system, external programs, and network connections.
ActiveX
ActiveX controls (Ernst 1996) are programs (in native x86 code) that can be executed on the client-side in Web pages. A digital signature is attached to each ActiveX control which identifies the control's author. The advantage of a signature is that since the author is known, an ActiveX control is permitted more freedom to access resources.
Unlike a LogicWeb program, which is sandboxed by policy programs and metainterpreters, a trusted ActiveX control is not restricted in any way and has access to all operating system services. Since an ActiveX control is native code, a suitable sandbox mechanism may be more difficult to implement (Object Management Group 1999).
Summary and Future Work
Security is a major concern for any system that executes downloaded code. This paper has described a security model for LogicWeb which protects the client host from integrity, privacy, and denial-of-service attacks. The security model is specified using proof rules in the operational semantics of the language. This specification permits a straightforward proof of the soundness of the model with respect to illegal system operations. Resource control of predicates invoked at the application level is carried out using policy programs. Resource control of programs using resource counts and loop checking is performed by meta-interpreters. Authentication provides varying trust levels, and different policy programs define resource access for the different trust levels.
The security model dynamically extends the LogicWeb system with selected policy programs. Since policy programs are separate from the system (and integrated only on-demand) they are a convenient means for imposing consistent security restrictions on multiple hosts. For example, similar Intranet-wide security restrictions can be imposed on a group of hosts by having them download the same policy programs (which, if needed, can be specialised by being composed with host-specific policies).
As noted in (Ousterhout et al. 1997) , it may be difficult to distinguish between legitimate behavior and denial-of-service attacks. For instance, it is easy to introduce resource bounds but difficult to state appropriate values for those bounds. If a value is too low, a useful task may be terminated prematurely; if too high, resource wastage occurs. A possible solution to this dilemma is to involve the user's judgment by providing query-the-user facilities via a meta-interpreter. The user could also utilise trace information supplied by the meta-interpreter to detect unwanted behavior, such as the movement of data between sites using the host's resources.
Some Prolog systems, such as SICStus Prolog, have a time-out facility for goal evaluation -the goal is terminated if its evaluation exceeds a given duration (Intelligent Systems Laboratory, Swedis This can be incorporated as a hard limit after other checks in our meta-interpreters: time out/3 terminates the execution of solve t/2 after Time milliseconds, with Result being set to timeout or success. Policy programs could be allocated based on the more general idea of credentials instead of digital signatures alone. For instance, a program might be allowed certain privileges not only because of its signature, but because it had sufficient advocates. Recent work by Seamons et al (1997) on using Prolog to encode digital credential acceptance policies and their verification logic could be exploited.
Policy programs simplify the administration of privileges to applications. Our policy assignment depends solely on the digital signature of the LogicWeb program. A more flexible method would involve multiple roles such as the program's manufacturer, owner, execution platform, or domain. For instance, suppose we trust particular domains (or URLs) and assume that data transfer is not intercepted and modified. We can assign policies based on the domains or URLs of the LogicWeb programs, regardless of whether they are signed. We modify determine policyID/3 of §8.2 as follows:
safe("http://www.cs.mu.oz.au/~swl").
% trusted URLs safe("http://www.cs.ait.ac.th/~ad"). determine_policyID(URL, _Contents, PolicyID) :-% safe URLs get a standard policy safe(URL), !, PolicyID = lw(get, "http://www.policyforthetrusted.com"). determine_policyID(URL, Contents, PolicyID) :-% check signature for everything else (pgp_signed(URL) -> authenticate(Contents, PGPID), pgpID_to_policyID(PGPID, PolicyID) ; pgpID_to_policyID(unknown, PolicyID) ).
Domain or zone-based policy assignment can be implemented this way.
LW-composition operators could be used to create policies from dynamically composed programs. For instance, assume that the program at http://www.usedownloadedpgms.com stores the clause:
valid program(X) :-program_exists(X).
determine policyID/3 can be modified to always combine this policy with the one being downloaded: determine_policyID(URL, Contents, Policy) :-(pgp_signed(URL) -> authenticate(Contents, PGPID), pgpID_to_policyID(PGPID, PolicyID) ; pgpID_to_policyID(unknown, PolicyID) ), Policy = lw(get,"http://www.usedownloadedpgms.com")+PolicyID. % combine policies
We have only considered policy programs created by the user of the LogicWeb system. If policies could be created by other parties, authentication would then become necessary for policy programs in addition to ordinary LogicWeb programs.
A limitation of our model is that the system must contain all the public keys required for the authentication of incoming programs. An automatic distribution mechanism for PGP public keys is needed. For example, the LogicWeb system could extract required public keys from homepages given their URLs, or could query Internet PGP public key servers 3 (Garfinkel 1995) . But this requires that the information be trusted, has not been tampered with, and is reliable. The use of credentials, i.e. certification by other authorities, would be required.
The LogicWeb security model is conservative in that a trusted program is not allowed to transfer its privileges to an untrusted program it is using. Besides resource usage privileges, another kind of privilege could be introduced: the right to transfer privileges. This would be useful when the system did not know the signatories of all the programs that a trusted program utilised. The policy program would have to specify which privileges were transferable, and whether the right to transfer privileges was itself transferable.
